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Abstract 
Over the last three decades, secular states, virtually everywhere, have come under severe strain. It is 
hardly surprising then that Political secularism, the doctrine that defends them, has also been subjected 
to severe criticism. Some scholars have concluded that this critique is ethically and morally so 
profound and justified that it is time to abandon political secularism. This paper rejects this 
conclusion. It argues that the criticism of secularism looks indefeasible only because critics have 
focused on mainstream conceptions developed in largely religiously homogenous societies. It claims 
that our focus must be shifted away from doctrines underpinning some western secular states towards 
the normative practices of a wide variety of states, including the best practices of non-western states 
such as India. Once we do this we will begin to see secularism differently, as a critical ethical and 
moral perspective not against religion but against religious homogenization and institutionalized 
(inter- and intra-religious) domination. This helps to throw different light on religion-related issues in 
society and might generate different perspectives on the kinds of policies to be forged.  
Keywords 
Political secularism, inter- and intra-religious domination, Principled distance, critical respect, 
contextualism 
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Introduction* 
Over the last three decades, secular states, virtually everywhere, have come under severe strain. It is 
hardly surprising then that Political secularism, the doctrine that defends them, has also been subjected 
to severe criticism. Some scholars have concluded that this critique is ethically and morally so 
profound and justified that it is time to abandon political secularism. I reject this conclusion. I argue 
that the criticism of secularism looks indefeasible only because critics have focused on mainstream 
conceptions developed in largely religiously homogenous societies. I claim that it is time we shifted 
focus away from doctrines underpinning some western secular states towards the normative practices 
of a wide variety of states, including the best practices of non-western states such as India. Once we do 
this we will begin to see secularism differently, as a critical ethical and moral perspective not against 
religion but against religious homogenization and institutionalized ( inter- and intra-religious) 
domination. Of all available alternatives, secularism remains our best bet to help us deal with ever 
deepening religious diversity and the problems endemic to it. Once these alternative conceptions 
implicit in the normative practices of states are dredged up, we shall see that we still do not possess a 
reasonable, morally and ethically sensitive alternative to secularism.  
Religion- centered states 
I begin with the assumption that ethical reasoning must be both contextual and comparative. Given 
this, we must consider the merits and demerits of secular and non-secular states, exploring what 
ethical gains or losses might ensue in the movement from a secular state to one that grants more 
importance to religion or vice versa. What then is wrong if states abandon secularism and become 
more religion-centred? If we value freedom and equality and are sensitive to religion-related 
domination, then we must find theocratic states- those which have union with a particular religious 
order and are believed to be governed by divine laws directly administered by a priestly order claiming 
divine commission (The Catholic Encyclopedia of Religion, Volume 14, 13) and states with 
established religions –states not governed by the sacerdotal order but which privilege one or some 
religions- morally and ethically defective. Such states perpetuate inter-religious and intra-religious 
domination. They have historically recognized a particular version of the religion enunciated by a 
church as the official religion: compelled individuals to congregate for only one church; punished 
them for failing to profess a particular set of religious beliefs; levied taxes in support of one particular 
church; and made instruction of the favoured interpretation of the religion in educational institutions 
mandatory. (Levy, 1994) In such cases, not only was there inequality among religions (Christians and 
Jews) but also among the churches of the same religion. Societies with such states were either wracked 
by inter-religious or inter-denominational wars or persecuted minority religious groups.  
States with substantive establishments have not changed with time. In our times, just consider 
Saudi Arabia (M Ruthven, 2002) Or consider Pakistan where the virtual establishment of the dominant 
Sunni sect has proved to be disastrous, even to Muslim minorities. For example, Ahmedis have been 
deemed as a non-Muslim minority and therefore convicted for calling themselves Muslims or using 
the word ‘mosque’ to designate their place of worship. (Malik 2002: 10; Bhargava 2004: 30). I have 
taken Saudi Arabia as illustrations. Surely the result would be the same if a Hindu state was 
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established in India. This would be a threat to religious minorities but also to the plural and tolerant 
character of Hinduism itself and therefore to a large number of practising Hindus. The ‘democratic’ 
state of Israel suffers from the same problem. Once it was declared a Jewish state it cannot but exclude 
from its full scheme of rights and benefits its own Arab citizens, leave alone other Palestinians.  
Secular states 
But are secular states really better? For a start, we should acknowledge that secular states and their 
underlying ideology, political secularism, appear to be under siege everywhere. They were severely 
jolted with the establishment of the first modern theocracy in 1979 in Iran. By the late 1980s, Islamic 
political movements had emerged in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, 
Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even in Bangladesh. (Westerlund 1996; Keppels 1994) Ahmed 
1987; Mohsin 1999). 
Movements challenging secular states were hardly restricted to Muslim societies. Protestant 
movements decrying secularism emerged in Kenya, Guatemala and the Philippines. Protestant 
fundamentalism became a force in American politics. Singhalese Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka, 
Hindu nationalists in India, religious ultra-orthodoxy in Israel and Sikh nationalists in the state of 
Punjab in India, as well as among diasporic communities in Canada and Britain, began to question the 
separation of state and religion. (Jeurgensmeyer 1994). In short, western conceptions of political 
secularism do not appear to have travelled all that well in other societies. What is surprising is that 
such conceptions and the secular states they underpin are coming under strain even in Europe where 
they were only some time back believed to be firmly entrenched and secure.  
Why so? It is true that substantive secularization of European societies has also brought in its wake 
extensive secularization of European states. Regardless of their religious affiliation, citizens have a 
large basket of civil and political rights unheard of in religion-centred states, past or present. But still, 
two problems remain. First, migration from former colonies and an intensified globalisation has 
thrown together on western public spaces pre-Christian faiths, Christianity and Islam (Turner 2001). 
The cumulative result is unprecedented religious diversity, the weakening of public monopoly of 
single religions, and the generation of mutual suspicion, distrust, hostility and conflict. This is evident 
in Germany and Britain but was dramatically highlighted by the headscarf issue in France and the 
murder of film-maker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands shortly after the release of his controversial 
film about Islamic culture. ( Bowen, 2006, Baruma, 2006, Freedman, 2004, Barker, 2004, Modood et 
al, 2006) Second, despite substantial secularization, the formal establishment of the dominant religion 
does little to bolster better inter-community relations or reduce religious discrimination in several 
European states. As it turns out the widespread belief of a secular European public sphere is a myth. 
The religious biases of European states have become increasingly visible with deepening religious 
diversity. European states have continued to privilege Christianity in one form or another. They have 
publicly funded religious schools, maintained real estates of churches and clerical salaries, facilitated 
the control by churches of cemeteries and trained the clergy. In short, there has been no impartiality 
within the domain of religion and despite formal equality, this continues to have far reaching impact 
on the rest of society. (Klausen, 2005) In the rest of the paper, I wish to focus on this crisis of secular 
states in Europe.  
To repeat, the crisis of secular states in Europe is due in part because the secular humanist ethos 
endorsed by many citizens is not fully shared, particularly by those who have newly acquired 
citizenship. Any further secularization along secular humanist lines is not likely to resolve the crisis of 
European secular states. Secondly, because many of these states have formally or informally 
established religion anyway and establishment of a single religion, even of the weaker variety, is part 
not of the solution but the problem. What, in the face of this imbroglio, are European states to do?  
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Those reflecting on this crisis have at least four conceptions of secularism staring back at them. To 
get hold of these conceptions, it is best to examine the conceptual structure of secular states: The state 
must be separated from religion for some ends. The four conceptions flow from the different ways in 
which the metaphor of separation is unpacked, the levels at which separation is sought and the manner 
in which ends are conceived. The first of these conception is thoroughly amoral and unethical because 
it separates religion from the state precisely because of the ethical or moral restrictions that religions 
place on its ends (wealth, power). These amoral secular states are inconsistent with the self-
organization and self-understanding of most European states, at least to the extent that they appear to 
have forsaken their imperial pretensions.  
Mainstream western secularisms: Part of the problem 
Indeed, the dominant self-understanding of western secularism is that it is a universal doctrine 
requiring the strict separation (exclusion) of church/religion and state for the sake of individualistically 
conceived moral or ethical values. This dominant self-understanding takes two forms, one inspired by 
an idealized version of the American model of separation and the other of the equally idealized French 
model. Can European states be reinvigorated by these two forms of western secularism? Can they then 
deal better with the new reality of the vibrant presence of multiple religions in public life and 
accompanying social tensions? In what follows I argue that available mainstream conceptions of 
western secularism are likely to meet neither the challenge of the vibrant public presence of religion 
nor of increasing religious diversity.  
The idealized French Model 
Take first the idealized French conception. On this conception, the state must be separated from 
religion at the level of (a) ends, (b) institutions and personnel but at level (c), the state retains the 
power to interfere in religion. However, religion is divested of any power to intervene in matters of 
state. In short, separation means one-sided exclusion. The state may interfere in religion to hinder or 
suppress it or even to help religion but in all cases only to ensure its control over religion. Religion 
becomes an object of law and public policy but only on terms of the state. This conception arose in 
response to the excessive domination of the Church, encourages an active disrespect for religion and is 
concerned solely with preventing the religious order from dominating the secular. It hopes to deal with 
institutionalized religious domination by taming and marginalizing religion altogether. This may help 
states to deal with aspects of intra-religious domination - one that exists when some members of a 
religious community dominate members of their own religion. (eg anti-clericalism in France) 
However, it has few resources to properly address inter-religious domination, when members of one 
religious community discriminate against, marginalize or even oppress members of another religious 
community.  
Why so? Because issues of radical individual freedom and citizenship equality arose in European 
societies after religious homogenization. The birth of confessional states was accompanied by massive 
expulsion of subject-communities whose faith differed from the religion of the ruler. Such states found 
some place for toleration in their moral space but as is well-known, toleration was consistent with 
deep inequalities and with humiliating, marginalized and virtually invisible existence. The liberal-
democratization and the consequent secularization of many European states has helped citizens with 
non-Christian faiths acquire most formal rights . But such scheme of rights neither embodies a regime 
of inter-religious equality nor effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and exclusion. Indeed, 
it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases. This is evident in different kinds of difficulties faced by 
Muslims. For example, in Britain a third of all primary school children are educated by religious 
communities. Yet applications for state funding by Muslims were frequently turned down. Four years 
after they were accepted, there were only two Muslim schools compared to 2,000 run by Roman 
Catholics and 4,700 of the Church of England. (Veit Beider, 2007) Similar problems persist in other 
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European countries. ( Modood, Triandafyllidou and Barrerro, 2006) This is also manifest in the failure 
of many western European States to deal with the issue of headscarves (France), demands by the 
Muslims to build mosques and therefore to properly practice their own faith ( Germany, Italy) or to 
have proper burial grounds of their own. (Denmark) In recent times, as Islamophobia grips the 
imagination of several western societies (exemplified by the cartoon controversy in Denmark), it is 
very likely that their Muslim citizens will continue to face disadvantage only on account of 
membership in religious community. (Bowen, 2006; Freeden; 2004, Barker 2004) 
Some sections in European societies, both from the Right and the Left are tempted to follow the 
French model largely because they have bought the view that ‘Islam is a problem’ and the only way to 
straighten the devil is to use the coercive power of the state. But this would be suicidal because it 
leaves formal and informal establishments of Christianity in these societies untouched. Besides, every 
attempt to further intervene in religions is likely to meet with resistance not only from Muslims but 
from non-Muslims too. Any reliance on this model is likely to exacerbate problems.  
The idealized American model  
Can these European states turn to the American model? The idealized American self-understanding 
interprets separation to mean mutual exclusion. Neither the state nor religion is meant to interfere in 
the domain of one another. This mutual exclusion is believed necessary to resolve conflicts between 
different Christian denominations, to grant some measure of equality between them but most crucially 
to provide individuals the freedom to set up and maintain their own religious associations. Mutual 
exclusion is believed necessary for religious liberty and for the more general liberties of individuals. 
This strict, or ‘perfect separation’ as Madison termed it, must take place at each of the three distinct 
levels- of (a) ends, (b) institutions and personnel and (c) law and public policy. Level (a) and (b) make 
the state non-theocratic and disestablish religion. Level (c) ensures that the state has neither a positive 
relationship with religion, for example there should be no policy of granting aid, even non-
preferentially, to religious institutions nor a negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of 
state activity to interfere in religious matters even when some of the values (such as equality) 
professed by the state are violated within the religious domain. The Congress simply has no power to 
legislate on any matter pertaining to religion. (Levy, 1994, Hamburger, 2002) ) This non-interference 
is justified on the ground that religion is a privileged, private (non-state) matter, and if something is 
amiss within this private domain, it can be mended only by those who have a right to do so within that 
sphere. This, according to proponents of this view, is what religious freedom means. Thus, the 
freedom that justifies mutual exclusion is negative liberty and is closely enmeshed with the 
privatisation of religion. In my view, this model of secularism encourages the state to have passive 
respect for religion. Idealized American secularism has some resources to fight inter-religious 
domination ( for instance, it necessitates the disestablishment of the dominant religion) but not to wage 
a struggle against other aspects of the same or against intra-religious dominations. Because the state is 
unable to facilitate freedoms or equality within religions, it forces people to exit from their religion 
rather than to press for intra-religious equality.  
It is now increasingly clear that both forms of western secularism have persistent difficulties coping 
with community-oriented religions such as Roman Catholicism, Islam, some forms of Hinduism and 
Sikhism that demand greater public presence and even official recognition for themselves — 
particularly when they begin to cohabit the same society. Moreover, they were not designed for 
societies with deep religious diversity. Both these versions developed in the context of a single-
religion society and to solve the problems of one religion, namely Christianity. Both understand 
separation as exclusion and make individualistically conceived values – individual liberty or equality 
between individuals or both – as the ground for separation. Because of their diversity-resistant 
character and individualistic character, both these forms of western secularism have become part of 
the problem.  
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Indian Model of Secularism 
Are we caught then between ideologies that legitimate religious domination of the secular and forms 
of secularisms that are unable to prevent forms of intra-religious or inter-religious domination? I 
believe it is possible to get out of this impasse because although theoretically less developed, there 
exists another model of secularism, one not generated exclusively in the west, which meets the needs 
of deeply religiously diverse societies and also complies with principles of freedom and equality: the 
sub-continental or Indian model found loosely in the best moments of inter-communal practice in 
India; and in the country’s constitution appropriately interpreted. In India, the existence of deep 
religious diversity has ensured a conceptual response not only to problems within religions but also 
between religions. Without taking it as a blue print, the west must examine the Indian conception and 
possibly learn from it.  
Several features of the Indian model are striking and relevant to wider discussion.  
First, multiple religions are not extras, added on as an afterthought but present at its starting-point, 
as part of its foundation. Indian secularism is inextricably tied to deep religious diversity. Second, it 
has a commitment to multiple values - liberty or/and equality, not conceived narrowly as pertaining to 
individuals but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities and 
equality of status in society, as well as other more basic values such as, peace and toleration between 
communities.. It has a place not only for rights of individuals to profess their religious beliefs but for 
the right of religious communities to establish and maintain educational institutions crucial for the 
survival and sustenance of their distinctive religious traditions.  
The acceptance of community-specific rights brings us to the third feature of Indian secularism. 
Because it was born in a deeply multi-religious society, it is concerned as much with inter-religious 
domination as it is with intra-religious domination. Unlike the two western conceptions which 
provided benefits to minorities only incidentally, (Jews benefited in some European countries such as 
France not because their special needs and demands were taken care of but rather because of a change 
in the general climate of the society), in India, even community-specific political rights (political 
reservations for religious minorities) were almost granted and were withheld in the last instance only 
for contextual reasons. In fact, it is arguable that a conceptual space is still available for them within 
the Indian constitution. 
Fourth, it does not erect a wall of separation between state and religion. There are boundaries, of 
course, but they are porous. This allows the state to intervene in religions, to help or hinder them 
without the impulse to control or destroy them. This involves multiple roles: granting aid to 
educational institutions of religious communities on a non-preferential basis; or interfering in socio-
religious institutions that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion or to those of 
others (for example, the ban on untouchability and the obligation to allow everyone, irrespective of 
their caste, to enter Hindu temples, and potentially to correct gender inequalities), on the basis of a 
more sensible understanding of equal concern and respect for all individuals and groups. In short, it 
interprets separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality but rather what I call principled 
distance, poles apart from one-sided exclusion, mutual exclusion and strict neutrality or equidistance.  
Fifth, it is not entirely averse to the public character of religions. Although the state is not identified 
with a particular religion or with religion more generally (there is no establishment of religion), there 
is official and therefore public recognition granted to religious communities.  
Sixth, this model shows that we do not have to choose between active hostility or passive 
indifference, or between disrespectful hostility or respectful indifference towards religion. We can 
combine the two: have the necessary hostility as long as there is also active respect: the state may 
intervene to inhibit some practices, so long as it shows respect for other practices of the religious 
community and it does so by publicly lending support to them. (Bhargava, 2009)  
Rajeev Bhargava 
6 
Seventh, by not fixing its commitment from the start exclusively to individual or community values 
or marking rigid boundaries between the public and private, India’s constitutional secularism allows 
decisions on these matters to be taken either within the open dynamics of democratic politics or by 
contextual reasoning in the courts. 
Finally, this commitment to multiple values and principled distance means that the state tries to 
balance different, ambiguous but equally important values. This makes its secular ideal more like a 
contextual, ethically sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement (which it really is), rather than a 
scientific doctrine conjured by ideologues and merely implemented by political agents.  
A somewhat forced, formulaic articulation of Indian secularism goes something like this. The state 
must keep a principled distance from all public or private, individual-oriented or community-oriented 
religious institutions for the sake of the equally significant (and sometimes conflicting) values of 
peace, this-worldly goods, dignity, liberty and equality (in all its complicated individualistic or non-
individualistic versions). Indian secularism then is an ethically sensitive negotiated settlement between 
diverse groups and divergent values. This model thus embodies what I call contextual secularism. 
Allow me to elaborate on two features mentioned above. First, principled distance and second, 
contextual secularism.  
Principled Distance 
As seen above, for mainstream western secularism, separation means mutual or one-sided exclusion. 
The idea of principled distance unpacks the metaphor of separation differently. It accepts a 
disconnection between state and religion at the level of ends and institutions but does not make a fetish 
of it at the third level of policy and law. (this distinguishes it from all other models of secularism, 
moral and amoral that disconnect state and religion at this third level) How else can it be in a society 
where religion frames some of its deepest interests? Recall that political secularism is an ethic whose 
concerns relating to religion are similar to theories that oppose unjust restrictions on freedom, morally 
indefensible inequalities, inter-communal domination and exploitation. Yet a secularism based on 
principled distance is not committed to the mainstream Enlightenment idea of religion. It accepts that 
humans have an interest in relating to something beyond themselves including God and that this 
manifests itself as individual belief and feeling as well as social practice in the public domain. It also 
accepts that religion is a cumulative tradition as well as a source of people's identities. (W.C.Smith 
1991) But it insists that even if turned out that God exists and that one religion is true and others false, 
then this does not give the 'true' doctrine or religion the right to force it down the throats of others who 
do not believe it. Nor does it give a ground for discrimination in the equal distribution of liberties and 
other valuable resources.  
Similarly, a secularism based on principle distance accepts that religion may not have special 
public significance antecedently written into and defining the very character of the state or the nation 
but it does not follow from this that it has no public significance at all. Sometimes, on some versions 
of it, the wall of separation thesis assumes precisely that. As long as religion is publicly significant, a 
democratic state simply has to take it into account. Indeed, institutions of religion may influence 
individuals as long as they do so through the same process, by access to the same resources as anyone 
and without undue advantage or unduly exploiting the fears and vulnerabilities that frequently 
accompany people in their experience of the religious.  
But what precisely is principled distance? The policy of principled distance entails a flexible 
approach on the question of inclusion/exclusion of religion and the engagement/disengagement of the 
state, which at the third level of law and policy depends on the context, nature or current state of 
relevant religions. (Bhargava 1998; Bhargava 2006(a); Bhargava 2006 (b)) This engagement must be 
governed by principles undergirding a secular state, i.e. principles that flow from a commitment to the 
values mentioned above. This means that religion may intervene in the affairs of the state if such 
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intervention promotes freedom, equality or any other value integral to secularism. For example, 
citizens may support a coercive law of the state grounded purely in a religious rationale if this law is 
compatible with freedom or equality. Equally, the state may engage with religion or disengage from it, 
engage positively or negatively but it does so depending entirely on whether or not these values are 
promoted or undermined. A state that intervenes or refrains from interference on this basis keeps a 
principled distance from all religions. This is one constitutive idea of principled distance. This idea is 
different from strict neutrality, i.e. the state may help or hinder all religions to an equal degree and in 
the same manner, that if it intervenes in one religion, it must also do so in others. Rather, it rests upon 
a distinction explicitly drawn by the American philosopher, Ronald Dworkin between equal treatment 
and treating everyone as an equal. (Dworkin 1978) The principle of equal treatment, in the relevant 
political sense, requires that the state treat all its citizens equally in the relevant respect, for example in 
the distribution of a resource of opportunity. On the other hand, the principle of treating people as 
equals entails that every person or group is treated with equal concern and respect. This second 
principle may sometimes require equal treatment, say equal distribution of resources but it may also 
occasionally dictate unequal treatment. Treating people or groups as equals is entirely consistent with 
differential treatment. This idea is the second ingredient in what I have called principled distance. I 
said that principled distance allows for differential treatment. What kind of treatment do I have in 
mind? First, religious groups have sought exemptions from practices in which states intervene by a 
promulgating a law to be applied neutrally to the rest of society. This demand for non-interference is 
made on the ground either that the law requires them to do things not permitted by their religion or 
prevents them from doing acts mandated by it. For example, Sikhs demand exemptions from 
mandatory helmet laws and from police dress codes to accommodate religiously required turbans. 
Elsewhere, Jews seek exemptions from Air force regulations to accommodate their yarmulkes. 
Muslims women and girls demand that the state not interfere in their religiously required chador. Jews 
and Muslims seek exemption from Sunday closing laws on the ground that this is not required by their 
religion. Principled distance allows then that a practice that is banned or regulated in one culture may 
be permitted in the minority culture because of the distinctive status and meaning it has for its 
members. For many republican or liberal theories this is a problem because of their simple, some what 
absolutist morality that gives overwhelming importance to one value, particularly to equal treatment or 
equal liberty. Religious groups may demand that the state refrain from interference in their practices 
but they may equally demand that the state interfere in such a way as to give them special assistance 
so that these groups are also able to secure what other groups are able to routinely get by virtue of their 
social dominance in the political community. It may grant authority to religious officials to perform 
legally binding marriages, to have their own rules or methods of obtaining a divorce, its rules about 
relations between ex-husband and ex-wife, its way of defining a will or its laws about post mortem 
allocation of property, arbitration of civil disputes, and even its method of establishment of property 
rights. Principled distance allows the possibility of such policies on the grounds that it might be unfair 
to hold people accountable to an unfair law. 
However, principled distance is not just a recipe for differential treatment in the form of special 
exemptions. It may even require state intervention in some religions more than in others, considering 
the historical and social condition of all relevant religions. For the promotion of a particular value 
constitutive of secularism, some religion, relative to other religions, may require more interference 
from the state. For example, suppose that the value to be advanced is social equality. This requires in 
part undermining caste hierarchies. If this is the aim of the state, then it may be required of the state 
that it interferes in caste-ridden Hinduism much more than say Islam or Christianity. However, if a 
diversity-driven religious liberty is the value to be advanced by the state, then it may have to intervene 
in Christianity and Islam more than in Hinduism. If this is so, the state can neither strictly exclude 
considerations emanating from religion nor keep strict neutrality with respect to religion. It cannot 
antecedently decide that it will always refrain from interfering in religions or that it will interfere in 
each equally. Indeed, it may not relate to every religion in society in exactly the same way or intervene 
in each religion to the same degree or in the same manner. To want to do so would be plainly absurd. 
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All it must ensure is that the relationship between the state and religions is guided by non-sectarian 
motives consistent with some values and principles. A state interfering in one religion more than in 
others does not automatically depart from secularism. Indian secularism rejects the assumption that 
‘one size fits all’ 
Contextual Secularism 
Contextual secularism is contextual not only because it captures the idea that the precise form and 
content of secularism will vary from one to another context and from place to place but also that it 
embodies a certain model of contextual moral reasoning. (Taylor 1994: 16-43; see also the argument 
in Parekh, 2000; and Carens, 2000). This it does because of its character as a multi-value doctrine and 
by virtue of its commitment to principled distance. To accept that secularism is a multi-value doctrine 
is to acknowledge that its constitutive values do not always sit easily with one another. On the 
contrary, they are frequently in conflict. Some degree of internal discord and therefore a fair amount of 
instability is an integral part of contextual secularism. For this reason, it forever requires fresh 
interpretations, contextual judgments and attempts at reconciliation and compromise. (Bhargava 2009; 
Bhargava 2010) This contextual secularism recognizes that the conflict between individual rights and 
group rights or between claims of equality and liberty or between claims of liberty and the satisfaction 
of basic needs cannot always be adjudicated by a recourse to some general and abstract principle. 
Rather they can only be settled case by case and may require a fine balancing of competing claims. 
The eventual outcome may not be wholly satisfactory to either but still be reasonably satisfactory to 
both. Multi-value doctrines such as secularism encourage accommodation – not the giving up of one 
value for the sake of another but rather their reconciliation and possible harmonization i.e. to make 
each work without changing the basic content of apparently incompatible concepts and values.  
This endeavour to make concepts, viewpoints and values work simultaneously does not amount to 
a morally objectionable compromise. This is so because nothing of importance is being given up for 
the sake of a less significant thing, one without value or even with negative value. Rather, what is 
pursued is a mutually agreed middle way that combines elements from two or more equally valuable 
entities. The roots of such attempts at reconciliation and accommodation lie in a lack of dogmatism, in 
a willingness to experiment, to think at different levels and in separate spheres and in a readiness to 
take decisions on a provisional basis. It captures a way of thinking characterized by the following 
dictum: ‘why look at things in terms of this or that, why not try to have both this and that.’ (Austin 
1996) In this way of thinking, it is recognized that though we may currently be unable to secure the 
best of both values and therefore be forced to settle for a watered-down version of each, we must 
continue to have an abiding commitment to search for a transcendence of this second best condition. It 
is frequently argued against Indian secularism that it is contradictory because it tries to bring together 
individual and community rights, and that articles in the Indian Constitution that have a bearing on the 
secular nature of the Indian state are deeply conflictual and at best ambiguous. (Tambiah, 1998) This 
is to mis-recognise a virtue as a vice. In my view, this attempt to bring together seemingly 
incompatible values is a great strength of Indian secularism.  
Discerning students of western secularism may now begin to find something familiar in this ideal. 
But then, Indian secularism has not dropped fully formed from the sky. It is not entirely sui generis It 
shares a history with the west. In part, it has learnt from and built on it. Indian secularism may be seen 
to be a route to retrieving the rich history of western secularism - forgotten, under emphasised, or 
frequently obscured by the formula of strict separation. If so, western societies can find reflected in it 
not only a compressed version of their own history but also a vision of their future. ( Bhargava, 
2006(b)) Yet to not distinguish it from mainstream conceptions is mistaken. Commentators such as 
Donald Smith, Ashis Nandy, T.N. Madan and Partha Chatterjee frequently fail to distinguish it from 
western conceptions (Smith. 1963; Nandy, Madan, Chatterjee in Bhargava 1998. Also see Galanter, 
1998)  
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Two Objections 
Two objections might arise on reading this. First, it might be said: look at the state of the subcontinent! 
Look at India! How deeply divided it remains! What about the violence against Muslims in Gujarat 
and against Christians in Orissa? How can success be claimed for the Indian version of secularism? I 
do not wish to underestimate the force of this objection. The secular ideal in India is in periodic crisis 
and is deeply contested. Besides, at the best of times, it generates as many problems as it solves.  
But it should not be forgotten that a secular state was set up in India despite the massacre and 
displacement of millions of people on ethno-religious grounds and it has survived in a continuing 
context in which ethnic nationalism remains dominant throughout the world. Moreover, it was set up 
to deal with the tensions continuously generated by deep religious diversity not to offer ‘a final 
solution’ by expulsion or liquidation of all but the dominant religious group. Yet, regardless of what 
they did in the past, is it not a fair expectation that European and North American states will not allow 
any attempt at ‘ethnic cleansing’ on their soil today? Surely, practioners of Indian secularism can learn 
from the institutional mechanism set up by European states to prevent inter-group violence. I agree. 
Some facets of the institutional basis of Indian secularism can be strengthened by the example of 
western states. To consolidate its minimally decent character, India can still learn from contemporary 
West. Yet, as different religious cultures claim their place in societies across the world, it may be 
India’s development of secularism that offers the most peaceful, freedom-sensitive and democratic 
way forward. In any case, this account must not be read as an apologia for the Indian state but as a 
reasonable and sympathetic articulation of a conception which the Indian state frequently fails to 
realize. My discussion is meant to focus on the comparative value of this conception and its potential 
for future and not on how in fact it has fared in India. And why should the fate of ideal conceptions 
with trans-cultural potential be decided purely on the basis of what happens to them in their place of 
origin?  
Second, it might be objected that I do not focus on the best practices of western states and 
emphasize the more vocal articulations of western secular conceptions. But that precisely is my point. 
The dominant conception of western secularism is derived from an idealized self-understanding of two 
of its versions rather than from the best practices of western states, including the practices of US and 
France. It is my view that this doctrinal conception (a) obstructs an understanding of alternative 
conceptions worked out on the ground by morally-sensitive political agents, (b) by influencing 
politicians and citizens alike, it frequently distorts the practice of many western and non-western 
states. And (c) it masks the many ways in which inter or intra-religious domination persists in many 
western societies. Moreover, it is this conception which has traveled to all parts of the world and is a 
continuing source of misunderstanding of the value of secular states. My objective is to displace these 
conceptions or at least put them in their place. 
Conclusion 
I hope to have demonstrated that there are at least two broad conceptions of secularisms, one 
mainstream western (the American and the French) and the other which provides an alternative to it 
and embodied in the Indian model. Of these, the Indian conception has better ethical and moral 
potential to deal with deep religious diversity. I do not wish to suggest that this alternative model is 
found only in India. The Indian case is meant to show that such an alternative exists. It is not meant to 
resurrect a dichotomy between the West and the East. As I have mentioned, I am quite certain that this 
alternative version is embedded in the best practices of many states, including those Western states 
that are deeply enamored by mainstream conceptions of political secularism. My objective in this 
essay is to draw attention to the frequent inability of ethical and political theorists to see the normative 
potential in the secular practices of these different states because they are obsessed with the 
normativity of mainstream conceptions. Western states need to improve the understanding of their 
own secular practices just as western secularism needs a better theoretical self-understanding. Rather 
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than get stuck on models they developed at a particular time in their history, they would do well to 
more carefully examine the normative potential in their own political practices or to learn from the 
original Indian variant.  
Possible Implications  
 The State cannot avoid having or endorsing a policy towards religion or religious organizations. 
Religion plays an important part in the lives of many people and religious institutions function in 
this world like other purely secular institutions. So, separation cannot mean the exclusion of 
religion from the domain of the State.  
 Separation of Church and State should also not be interpreted as absolute or strict neutrality. No 
State can possibly help or hinder all religions in the same manner and to the same degree. 
 The State may interfere with religion and refrain from such interference depending entirely on 
which of these promotes the values of freedom and equality or undermines inter-religious and 
intra-religious dominations. 
 Values of freedom and equality must be interpreted both as rights of individuals, and wherever 
required, as rights of communities. Community rights are particularly important if religious 
groups are vulnerable or, because of their small number, have relatively little power to influence 
the process of decision making. 
 Secularism must be neither servile nor hostile to religion. It must manifest an attitude of neither 
blind deference nor indifference but of critical respect towards all religions. 
 Secularism which professes principled distance and is sensitive to multiple values cannot avoid 
making contextual judgements. Contextual judgements allow for ethically sensitive balancing 
and compromise. 
 Those who think that they are emancipated from religion or believe that their own religion is 
emancipated, but not that of others, should accept with humility that none of its achievements 
are irreversible. They should also not fail to remember the history of oppressions within their 
own respective religions as well as the repressive policies of many secular States. As more and 
more societies become multi religious, a sense of vulnerability of ones’ own religions, indeed of 
one’s own world view will be crucial for a peaceful and just world order.  
If secularism is to survive as a trans-cultural normative perspective, it must be de-Christianised, de-
Westernised, de-privatised and de-individualized. In saying so, I do not mean that it must wholly sever 
its links with Christianity or the West but its ties with them must be loosened. It should be able to 
accommodate other civilizations and community based rights. Only with this form of secularism and a 
State nourished by it, can deep religious diversity be managed.  
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